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Abstract
We examine how an introduction of education subsidies affects growth
rates, incorporating an uncertain lifetime. We demonstrate that the intro-
duction of subsidies engenders higher growth rates in aging economies, except
when the education-tax rate is sufficiently low.
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1 Introduction
Industrial countries are aging rapidly. When we intend to maintain pay-as-you-go
financed pension systems with moderate benefits, the tax burdens of the young-
working generation become much heavier. Therefore, young-working households
who save some after-tax income for a longer retired period cannot afford to invest
much in their children. In this paper, we examine effects of education subsidies to
complement parental educational investment, considering aging effects.
The effectiveness of education subsidies has been widely discussed by Zhang
and Casagrande (1998), Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999), and Wigger (2004), among
others. Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999) show that the introduction of education
subsidies can engender higher growth rates only if (i) parents have overly low
preference levels for their children to invest privately in the children’s education,
and (ii) parents happen to have a medium preference level for children, and the
government has large education revenue (and relatively small pension revenue).
In other cases, the usual negative effects of subsidies, which crowd out parental
private investment, are so large that the introduction of education subsidies has a
negative effect, or none at all, on the growth rate.
Our motivation is to determine the effectiveness of education subsidies in aging
countries where parents cannot afford to invest much in their children’s education.
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Incorporating an uncertain lifetime to a model that is based on Kaganovich and
Zilcha (1999), we demonstrate that, in the case of aging economies, the introduction
of education subsidies engenders a higher growth rate, except when the education-
tax rate is sufficiently low.
2 The model
We consider an overlapping-generations model of endogenous growth, incorporating
an uncertain lifetime. The life of a representative individual is divided into three
periods: a childhood and a young-working period (each with fixed duration), and
a retirement period (of uncertain length). The individual is alive at the beginning
of the third period with probability p ∈ (0, 1]. Let Nt denote the number of
working-aged individuals, who have n children, in period t. Savings of individuals
who have died at the onset of the third period are distributed among the retired
individuals as an actuarially fair annuity.1 The expected rate of return to savings is
(1+ρt+1) =
(1+rt+1)
p
, where (1+rt+1) is the return of direct holdings of capital. The
government supplies education to children and social security benefits to retired
individuals by taxing the labor income of young-working individuals. First, we
examine an education-subsidy policy (ESP), by which the government provides
1This is a simplified version of Blanchard’s (1985) model.
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both education subsidies and public schools. Secondly, we show the equilibrium
of a public-school policy (PSP) in which the government supplies public schools
alone. Thereafter, we compare the two growth rates in the next section.
In childhood, individuals only accumulate human capital. Young individuals
receive a wage income, which is taxed away. They divide their income among ed-
ucation expenditures for their children, net, their current consumption, c
y
t , and in-
vesting in annuities, at, for their post-retirement consumption, c
o
t+1. Subsequently,
living individuals obtain principal and interest from their annuities and consume
them with their pension benefits, Tt+1, after retirement.
Let ht+1 be the human capital level of each individual who is born at time t
and called generation t+ 1. Human capital is accumulated according to:
ht+1 = (et + νt)
γ(egt )
1−γ.
In that equation, γ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the efficiency of education input provided
privately, such as textbooks and tutors. The education subsidy given by the gov-
ernment is νt, and e
g
t is the public-school quality provided by the government.
2
The subsidies are used directly for human capital accumulation as in the methods
2We call egt ”public-school quality”, as do Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), to distinguish strictly
between νt, which is subsidized to private parental investment, and e
g
t . We can also regard e
g
t as
other public educational investment like libraries, museums, and so on.
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of Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999). Individuals determine the amount of private
investment for their children, taking the value of νt and e
g
t as given.
The budget constraints of a member of generation t when young and retired are
given, respectively, as (1−τt−ω)wtht = cyt +net+at and (1+ρt+1)at+Tt+1 = cot+1,
where τt is the social-security-tax rate, and ω is the education-tax rate. The lifetime
utility function of generation t is represented as3
ut = lnc
y
t + plnc
o
t+1 + δnlnht+1.
By solving individuals’ optimization problems, the optimal values are given as
et =
γδ
(1+p+γδn)
It − (1+p)(1+p+γδn)νt, cyt = 1(1+p+γδn)It, cot+1 = p(1+p+γδn)(1 + ρt+1)It, and
at =
p
(1+p+γδn)
It − Tt+1(1+ρt+1) , where It≡ (1− τt − ω)wtht +
Tt+1
(1+ρt+1)
.
The aggregate production function at time t is given as Yt = AK
α
t (htNt)
1−α,
where Yt, A, Kt, and α∈(0, 1) respectively denote the aggregate output, the produc-
tivity parameter, the physical capital that fully depreciates in the production pro-
cess, and the share of physical capital. Because the factor markets are presumed to
be perfectly competitive, the firms take factor prices as given: wt = A(1−α)( KthtNt )
α
,
(1 + rt) = Aα(
Kt
htNt
)
α−1
.
The government allocates the µ ∈ [0, 1) portion of the education-tax revenue to
3With an uncertain lifetime, p∈(0, 1], this utility form is employed by Pecchenino and Pollard
(2002) and Yakita (2001), among others.
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education subsidies and the (1−µ) portion of it to public schools.4 Here, µ is treated
as a predetermined parameter and is constant over time. Budget constraints of the
government at time t are
Education subsidies ; νt =
µω
n
wtht,
Public schools ; egt =
(1− µ)ω
n
wtht.
Social security payments are specified as a replacement rate, φ ∈ (0, 1), on
current workers’ wage income, as
Tt = φwtht. (1)
Total pension benefits must be balanced by pension revenue:
TtpNt−1 = τtwthtNt. (2)
From (1) and (2), the social-security-tax rate is determined as
τt =
pφ
n
≡ τ.
4When µ = 0, it means PSP is operated.
6
Note that this contribution rate is increasing in the degree of aging, p.
By employing the capital market-clearing condition, Kt+1 = atNt, the human
capital level of generation t+ 1 is represented as
ht+1 = (
s∗ν{1 + (1−α)α τ}γδ
p
)γ(
(1− µ)ω
n
)1−γwtht≡h∗νwtht,
where
s∗ν ≡
p{1− τ − (1− µ)ω}
{(1 + p+ γδn) + (1 + γδn) (1−α)
α
τ} .
Consequently, the per-capita growth rate at time t is constant over time:
(1 + gν,t) ≡
Yt+1
Nt+1
Yt
Nt
=
A(1− α)
n
s∗ν
α(h∗νn)
1−α ≡ (1 + gν). : ESP
When there are no education subsidies, µ = 0, the per-capita growth rate at time
t is given as
(1 + gt) ≡
Yt+1
Nt+1
Yt
Nt
=
A(1− α)
n
s∗α(h∗n)1−α ≡ (1 + g), : PSP
where
s∗ ≡ p(1− τ − ω){(1 + p+ γδn) + (1 + γδn) (1−α)
α
τ} ,
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and
h∗ ≡ (s
∗{1 + (1−α)
α
τ}γδ
p
)γ(
ω
n
)1−γ.
3 Education subsidies vs. Public schools
We shall set the ratio of the growth rate of ESP, (1 + gν), to the growth rate of
PSP, (1 + g), as
G(p) ≡ (1 + gν)
(1 + g)
= (1− µ)( 1− τ − (1− µ)ω
(1− τ − ω)(1− µ))
α+(1−α)γ.
Inferring that the social-security-tax rate, τ , is influenced by the degree of aging,
p, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition.
(1) When the education-tax rate is higher than ωH , the ESP implies a higher growth
rate than the PSP.
(2) When the education-tax rate is medium, as ωL ≤ ω ≤ ωH , the ESP implies:
(2a) a higher growth rate if the degree of aging is higher than pˆ
(2b) a lower growth rate if the degree of aging is lower than pˆ
than the PSP.
(3) When the education-tax rate is lower than ωL, the ESP implies a lower growth
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rate than the PSP.
These threshold values are:
ωH =
1− (1− µ) 1α+γ(1−α)−1
1− (1− µ) 1α+γ(1−α)
∈ (0, 1),
ωL =
(1− φ
n
){1− (1− µ) 1α+γ(1−α)−1}
1− (1− µ) 1α+γ(1−α)
∈ (0, 1),
pˆ =
n
φ
[(1− ω)− {1− (1− µ)ω}(1− µ) 1α+γ(1−α)−1]
{1− (1− µ) 1α+γ(1−α)−1}
∈ (0, 1).
Proof. See Appendix.
0 1
1
p
ωL ωH ω
pˆ
(1)
(2a)
Figure 1: The growth rate of ESP is higher than that of PSP in shaded area.
If public-school investment by the government is overly large compared to pri-
vate investment, transferring some part of education revenue from public-school
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investment to education subsidies that complement private investment leads to
more efficient allocation and yields higher growth rates. In our model, parental in-
vestment becomes smaller in such economies in which parents have smaller after-tax
income because of a higher education-tax rate (i.e. Proposition (1)), and those in
which parents intend to save a larger part of income for a longer retirement period
in spite of heavier social-security burdens (i.e. Proposition (2a)). In other words,
except when the education-tax rate is sufficiently low (0 < ω < ωL), parental pri-
vate investment is much smaller than public-school investment in aging economies.
In that event, the introduction of education subsidies leads to higher growth rates.
The implications of our results are similar to those of Kaganovich and Zilcha
(1999): when private investment is not made sufficiently by parents, the com-
plements to private investment using education subsidies engender higher growth
rates under the same tax revenue.5 However, although the threshold levels of
parental preferences for their children hold important meaning for results revealed
in Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999), the levels of preferences vary among individuals
and are difficult to measure. Our contribution is to have demonstrated that two
observable parameters – the degree of aging in the economy and the education-tax
5When parental investment is sufficiently large because of a lower education-tax rate and a
lower aging degree (the lower left area in Fig. 1), the ESP engenders a lower growth rate than
the PSP. This result differs from that of Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999), in which the introduction
of education subsidies has no effect on the growth rate if parents invest much in their children
because of larger preference for their children.
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rates – become thresholds of determining the subsidies’ effects by incorporating an
uncertain lifetime into the model of Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999).
4 Concluding remarks
We have examined how the introduction of education subsidies affects growth rates,
incorporating an uncertain lifetime. We have demonstrated that introducing subsi-
dies engenders higher growth rates in aging economies, except when the education-
tax rate is sufficiently low.
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Appendix.
Proof. Using τ = pφ
n
, we recognize that the ratio, G(p), is increasing in aging
degree, p, as
sign(
∂G(p)
∂p
) = sign(
φ
n
{α + (1− α)γ}µω
{1− τ − (1− µ)ω}(1− τ − ω)) > 0.
Initially, we shall see at p = 0. The range of the education-tax rate, which is
satisfied with
G(p = 0) ≥ 1,
is expressed as
ω ≥ 1− (1− µ)
1
α+γ(1−α)−1
1− (1− µ) 1α+γ(1−α)
≡ ωH .
Therefore, when the education-tax rate is higher than ωH , G(p) > 1 is always
satisfied in p ∈ (0, 1]. The ESP always engenders a higher growth rate.
Secondly, in a similar fashion, we check at p = 1. The range of the education-tax
rate, which is satisfied with
G(p = 1) ≥ 1,
is given as
ω≥(1−
φ
n
){1− (1− µ) 1α+γ(1−α)−1}
1− (1− µ) 1α+γ(1−α)
≡ ωL.
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That is, when the education-tax rate is ωL ≤ ω ≤ ωH , G(p) > 1 is satisfied at least
at p = 1. In contrast, when the education-tax rate is ω < ωL, G(p) remains less
than 1 over p ∈ (0, 1]. Consequently, when the education-tax rate is lower than ωL,
the PSP always leads to a higher growth rate.
Finally, in the case where education-tax rate is medium, as ωL ≤ ω ≤ ωH , the
value of G(p), which is an increasing function in p, is less than 1 at p = 0 and
more than 1 at p = 1. Here, a threshold value of p is satisfied with G(p) = 1. This
threshold value is expressed as
pˆ =
n
φ
[(1− ω)− {1− (1− µ)ω}(1− µ) 1α+γ(1−α)−1]
{1− (1− µ) 1α+γ(1−α)−1}
(ωL ≤ ω ≤ ωH).
Accordingly, when the economy’s degree of aging is lower than pˆ, the value of G(p)
remains less than 1. When the degree of aging is higher than pˆ, G(p) is greater
than 1. Consequently, it is only in aging economies (pˆ < p) that the ESP leads to
a higher growth rate when the education-tax rate is medium, as ωL ≤ ω ≤ ωH .
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